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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you’re a criminal-defense lawyer, maybe not many years out
of school. Much of your income is from court appointments. One of those
appointments involved an open-and-shut case of drug activity. You do
your best to defend, but your client is convicted. He now wants you to
appeal, but you’re confident there’s nothing in the record or the law that
would warrant a reversal.
Imagine you’re an appellate judge. Appointed defense counsel files
a motion to withdraw, claiming she can think of no good-faith basis for
appeal. Do you grant the motion? And, if so, do you appoint someone else
to pursue the appeal, or do you accept her representation and dispose of
the case accordingly? What standards do you use in selecting between
these options?
Now imagine you’re the client. You’re young and poor, probably
male, 1 maybe a minority. 2 You have distrusted the legal system your
whole life, even before they locked you up. You think you were set up for
1. See Roya Butler et al., Correctional Facilities, 20 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 357, 359 (2019)
(“number of women in prison remains far less than the number of male inmates, at approximately 7%
of the total prison population”).
2. See, e.g., Leah Sakala, Breaking down Mass Incarceration in the 2010 Census: State-byState Incarceration Rates by Race/Ethnicity, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 28, 2014),
https://tinyurl.com/y3kfabg6 [https://perma.cc/APJ4-6TAW].
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this drug crime. And now your lawyer is telling you—and the court—that
you have no case for appeal. It figures.
Welcome to the confusing world of Anders briefing, so called for the
seminal 1967 Supreme Court case that purported to articulate a
nationwide standard for protecting the appellate rights of low-income
defendants in these types of difficult cases.3 Anders identified a procedure
for counsel and the courts to follow if counsel can identify no nonfrivolous
issues for appellate review.4 The Supreme Court recognizes that counsel
rely on Anders briefs “[n]ot infrequently.” 5
But the Anders procedure presents an inherent challenge: how to
balance the three triangulated interests—that of the client, the lawyer, and
the court—in a fashion that meets constitutional demands without
imposing excessive burdens or compromising a defendant’s constitutional
rights. The Anders procedure is thus fraught with difficulties, precisely
because of the tensions it creates among these interested parties. How can
counsel ethically advise a court that her client has no nonfrivolous issue
for appellate review? How can a court, without the benefit of full
advocacy, endorse such a position? And what is a client without money
or legal training supposed to do when his court-appointed lawyer is
convinced he has no case?
As the Court has recognized, Anders has been the subject of
“consistent and severe criticism.” 6 Courts have thus struggled for over
fifty years to articulate helpful standards for applying Anders; the Court
has itself decided at least five cases since 1967 attempting to stem the
confusion. 7 Surprisingly, however, only a handful of scholars has focused
on the Anders procedure, most arguing to abolish it and require counsel to

3. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
4. Id. at 744.
5. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 264 (2000).
6. “We recognize that, since the day it was decided, Anders has been subjected to ‘consistent
and severe criticism.’” In re Sade C., 920 P.2d 716, 731 (Cal. 1996) (quoting Frederick D. Junkin,
Note, The Right to Counsel in “Frivolous” Criminal Appeals: A Reevaluation of the Guarantees of
Anders v. California, 67 TEX. L. REV. 181, 212 (1988)), quoted in Smith, 528 U.S. at 281.
7. See Smith, 528 U.S. 259 (approving state procedure that requires counsel only to
summarize the trial-court proceedings and leaves determination of frivolousness entirely to appellate
court); McCoy v. Ct. of App. of Wisc., 486 U.S. 429 (1988) (Constitution does not foreclose state
rule requiring counsel invoking Anders to explain why client’s appeal is frivolous); Penson v. Ohio,
488 U.S. 75 (1988) (reversing state-court decision rejecting appeal where counsel filed inadequate
Anders brief and where court disposed of case without appointing new appellate counsel);
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (Anders does not require counsel to file frivolous petition
for certiorari to U.S. Supreme Court); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) (Anders does not require
counsel to raise on appeal every issue identified by the client).
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brief the merits of the appeal 8 (as the American Bar Association
recommends 9 and as ten states have done 10). Issues with Anders have also
garnered occasional attention from law students. 11 And one scholar,
herself a state-court appellate judge, demonstrated the lack of uniformity
in the way state courts apply Anders. 12
Anders is rooted in nearly a century of Supreme Court decisions
recognizing a state-court defendant’s right to counsel under the Federal
Constitution, 13 including on appeal. 14 While the seminal cases originated
in state-court prosecutions, the teachings of Anders apply with equal force
in federal court. With the growing “federalization of criminal law,” 15
crimes associated with poverty are prosecuted in federal court with
regularity. 16 In recognition of their obligation to provide an Anders
8. See generally Eric B. Schmidt, A Call to Abandon the Anders Procedure that Allows
Appointed Appellate Criminal Counsel to Withdraw on Grounds of Frivolity, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 199
(2011); Randall L. Hodgkinson, No-Merit Briefs Undermine the Adversarial Process in Criminal
Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 55 (2001); James E. Duggan & Andrew W. Moeller, Make Way
for the ABA: Smith v. Robbins Clears a Path for Anders Alternatives, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 65
(2001). See also Brent E. Newton, Alemendarez-Torres and the Anders Ethical Dilemma, 45
HOUSTON L. REV. 747, 748–52 (2008) (reflecting on dilemma counsel can face when advancing an
argument that runs counter to Supreme Court precedent and when the good-faith basis for reversing
that precedent is questionable).
9. Duggan & Moeller, supra note 8, at 93–94 (quoting ABA STANDARDS, PROVIDING
DEFENSE SERVICES § 5.3 (tentative draft 1967)).
10. See Martha C. Warner, Anders in the Fifty States: Some Appellants’ Equal Protection Is
More Equal than Others’, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 642 (1996) (“Ten states have rejected the
Anders procedure.”).
11. See, e.g., Matthew D. Fazekas, Note, An Open Letter to the Ohio Supreme Court: Setting
a Uniform Standard on Anders Briefs, 68 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 581 (2020) (arguing that Ohio should
adopt uniform Anders standards); Joseph Frueh, Note, The Anders Brief in Appeals from Civil
Commitment, 118 YALE L.J. 272 (2008) (arguing that Anders procedure should apply in civilcommitment appeals); Cynthia Yee, Comment, The Anders Brief and the Idaho Rule: It Is Time for
Idaho to Reevaluate Criminal Appeals After Rejecting the Anders Procedure, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 143
(2002) (arguing for application of Anders procedure in Idaho state courts); Junkin, supra note 6
(defending Anders and suggesting guidelines for determining adequacy of an Anders brief).
12. See generally Warner, supra note 10.
13. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
14. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
15. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 7–9 (1998); see also Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960,
2008 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting Edwin E. Meese, Big Brother on the Beat: The
Expanding Federalization of Crime, 1 TEXAS L. REV. L. & POL’Y 1, 22 (1997) (“Some suggest that
‘the federal government has [now] duplicated virtually every major state crime.’”)).
16. The vast majority of criminal defendants in the federal system meet the financial criteria
for appointed counsel. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Federal Immigration Arrests Increased Along U.S.-Mexico Border Between 2005 and
2009, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/fjs09pr.cfm [https://perma.cc/ZHQ7-DQ46] (“Of the
95,000 federal cases concluded in 2009, 40 percent were represented by a public defender . . . , 36
percent by a panel-appointed attorney . . . and 21 percent by a private attorney . . . .”).
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framework, nine federal circuits have adopted local rules governing
Anders briefing, 17 and another three have published guidelines for counsel
seeking to withdraw under Anders. 18 The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have
both published similar guidelines. 19 But no scholar has examined Anders
in the federal appellate system. I fill that gap here.
This paper suggests a framework for resolving the confusion in
federal appellate courts. That framework removes the court from the
process entirely, leaving it to three tiers of counsel, each with greater
financial incentive than her predecessor, to scour the record and root out
good-faith bases for appellate review.20 If, after three reviews, no lawyer
has identified a nonfrivolous basis for appeal, then the court may safely
assume there is none. At that point, it may discharge counsel and dismiss
the appeal unless the defendant wishes to pursue it pro se or through a
lawyer not at public expense.
The paper proceeds in six parts, of which this introduction is Part I.
Part II provides an overview of Anders, including its history and
subsequent Supreme Court clarification. Part III focuses specifically on
the federal circuits’ approaches to Anders submissions. Part IV then
delves into the competing interests of counsel, the court, and the client,
explaining the quandaries Anders has created for each. Part V explains the
solution I propose; that solution is imperfect, but it would be a vast
improvement over existing practice. Part VI concludes.

17. See 1ST CIR. R. 46.6(c)(4); 2D CIR. R. 4.1(b); 3D CIR. R. 109.2; 6TH CIR. R. 12(c)(4)(C);
7TH CIR. R. 51(b); 8TH CIR. R. 27B(b); 9TH CIR. R. 4-1(C); 10TH CIR. R. 46.4(B)(1)–(3); 11TH CIR.
27-1(A)(8).
18. See UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, CJA Representation,
https://tinyurl.com/y36u6oks [https://perma.cc/HE54-YBN4] [hereinafter 4th Cir. CJA
Representation]; Anders Guidelines, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT,
https://tinyurl.com/ydhbzmgw [https://perma.cc/8D6E-V9KN] [hereinafter 5th Cir. Anders
Guidelines]; UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, HANDBOOK OF
PRACTICE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES § VI(D)(2) at 26 (Dec. 2018), https://tinyurl.com/y77f8h64
[https://perma.cc/S38N-JMGW] [hereinafter D.C. CIR. HANDBOOK].
19. See 6TH CIR. R. 12(c)(4)(C); UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT,
Notes on Anders Cases, https://tinyurl.com/yyqe7a6l [https://perma.cc/W3Y5-VHDV] [hereinafter
6th Circuit Notes]; 7TH CIR. R. 51(b); PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK FOR APPEALS TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, §§ XIV(B) & XVII(C), at 102, 116–18
(2019), https://tinyurl.com/yytgch28 [https://perma.cc/NE4L-X7XH] [hereinafter 7TH CIR.
PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK].
20. I completed the first draft of this article in November 2019. The next month—but before
this article was published—an Ohio appellate judge independently proposed the same idea. See State
v. Sims, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107724, 2019–Ohio–4975, ¶ 35 (Sheehan, J., concurring).
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II. THE RIGHT TO APPELLATE COUNSEL: THE ORIGINS OF ANDERS AND
ITS PROGENY
A.

The Historical Legal Framework that Led to the Anders Decision

Anders sprang from a state-court conviction in California 21 and has
its roots in the Supreme Court’s incremental recognition that certain
federal constitutional principles apply to defendants in state-court
criminal proceedings. “The constitutional underpinnings of Anders and its
progeny rely alternatively on both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution,” 22 often “shift[ing] among equal protection, due
process, and right of counsel concerns.” 23 Those concerns will lie at the
heart of any solution crafted to address an Anders-style conundrum, so it
is important to understand the history leading to the Anders decision and
the ways in which the Court has revisited that decision in subsequent
cases.
1. The Right to Trial Counsel: Powell v. Alabama, Betts v. Brady,
and Gideon v. Wainwright
Perhaps owing to a popular book and a television movie, 24 Gideon v.
Wainwright 25 is often widely recognized as the source of the right to trial
counsel in criminal state-court proceedings, and deservedly so. But
Gideon came three decades after Powell v. Alabama,26 a case that deserves
its own recognition, both for its holding and for the insidious story behind
it. 27
In 1931 Alabama, nine African-American teenagers, one only
thirteen years old, were arrested for raping two white women in a railroad
21. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 739 (1967).
22. Warner, supra note 10, at 626; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
23. Warner, supra note 10, at 641.
24. ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (1964); GIDEON’S TRUMPET (Worldvision Enters.
1980).
25. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
26. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
27. Though the story behind Powell is less well known, it also been the subject of many
historical and creative works, including several books, e.g., DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A
TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1969), a television drama, JUDGE HORTON AND THE
SCOTTSBORO BOYS (Tomorrow Entertainment 1976), an Oscar-nominated documentary film,
SCOTTSBORO: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY (PBS 2001), and a Tony Award-nominated Broadway
musical, DAVID THOMPSON, JOHN KANDER, & FRED EBB, THE SCOTTSBORO BOYS (2010). The case
inspired several other legal decisions of note, including Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935)
(overturning convictions based on removal of African-American citizens from jury venire), and Street
v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1981) (affirming judgment for television
network sued for defamation by one of the alleged victims based on her depiction in television drama).
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boxcar in which all of them, and several white men, were stowing a ride
from Chattanooga, Tennessee. 28 They were removed from the train in
Paint Rock, Alabama, near the city of Scottsboro. 29 The defendants came
to be known as the Scottsboro boys, 30 and they were convicted in a trial
that took place “six days after indictment” 31 under an aura of “great
hostility.” 32 As one commentator has noted, “[i]n such cases, guilt or
innocence usually mattered little.” 33
The case reached the Supreme Court on the question of right to
counsel, because the defendants essentially had none. “[U]ntil the very
morning of the trial no lawyer had been named or definitely designated to
represent the defendants.” 34 Even then, the record was unclear whether
anyone actually represented them at trial.35 The Court thus recognized that
“defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in any substantial
sense.” 36
Until Powell, however, the Court had not recognized that the right to
counsel in criminal cases, enshrined in federal court under the Sixth
Amendment, 37 applied to state-court prosecutions. To the contrary, the
Court had rejected, on textual grounds, the principle that the Fourteenth
Amendment 38 extended the entirety of federal criminal-law protections to
state-court proceedings. 39 Powell, then—in holding that “[i]t was the duty
of the court having their cases in charge to see that they were denied no
necessary incident of a fair trial” 40—marked a pivot in the Court’s view
of the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. In recognizing a criminal
defendant’s right to “the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him,” 41 the Court shifted its constitutional philosophy
in a fashion perhaps more abrupt than it would later do in Gideon 42 and
certainly decades earlier.
28. Michael J. Klarman, Scottsboro, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 379, 379–80 (2009).
29. Id. at 380.
30. Id. at 379.
31. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 52 (1932).
32. Id. at 51 (“It is perfectly apparent that the proceedings from beginning to end, took place
in an atmosphere of tense, hostile, and excited public sentiment.”).
33. Klarman, supra note 28, at 382.
34. Powell, 287 U.S. at 56.
35. Id. (recounting “casual fashion” in which court addressed question of defendants’
representation, leaving much ambiguity on who, if anyone, represented them).
36. Id. at 58.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
39. Powell, 287 U.S. at 63 (discussing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)).
40. Id. at 52.
41. Id. at 69.
42. Gideon v Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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But Gideon is important, because the Court’s right-to-counsel
decisions following Powell were more equivocal. In Betts v. Brady, for
example, the Court surveyed state constitutions for guidance on the
universality of the right to counsel. 43 Finding lack of unanimity among
them, the Court was “unable to say that the concept of due process
incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the states, whatever
may be their own views, to furnish counsel in every such case.” 44 Instead,
the Court left it to each state court itself, “it deems proper, to appoint
counsel where that course seems to be required in the interest of
fairness.” 45 Although the Court offered no clear distinction of its prior
holding in Powell, it portrayed Powell as a case involving unique
circumstances of unfairness—both because the trial court in Powell failed
to follow an applicable Alabama statute and because it was a capital
case. 46 The dissent was unwilling to indulge such distinctions, urging
instead that under Powell, “[t]he right to counsel in a criminal proceeding
is ‘fundamental.’” 47
In light of Betts, then, Gideon was in fact seminal. The Gideon Court
held that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of criminal-defense counsel
in federal cases is “one of the[] fundamental rights” that flow to statecourt defendants through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. 48 Despite the wavering holdings on the subject before Gideon, the
issue for trial purposes has been settled since then.
2. The Right to Appellate Counsel: Griffin v. Illinois and Douglas
v. California
The next step toward Anders came in a pair of decisions that focused
on a state-court defendant’s rights on appeal from a criminal conviction.
First, in Griffin v. Illinois, 49 the Court recognized that low-income
defendants enjoy a federal right of access to a state-court trial transcript
in order to prosecute an appeal. In doing so, the Court expanded its
analysis to include not only due process, but also equal protection; 50 it
recognized that “a State is not required by the Federal Constitution to
43. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 467–71 (1942).
44. Id. at 471.
45. Id. at 471–72.
46. Id. at 463.
47. Id. at 475 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 70 (1932)).
48. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
49. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
50. See id. at 17 (“[O]ur own constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection both
call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious discriminations between persons and
different groups of persons.”).
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provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all,” 51 but it
cautioned that “a State that does grant appellate review” cannot “do so in
a way that discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of
their poverty.” 52 The pursuit of “equal justice,” the Court held, falters
“where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he
has.” 53
It was a short leap, then—both temporally and doctrinally—to a
nationally recognized right to appellate counsel in state-court appeals. The
Court recognized that right for the first time nine years after Griffin, in
Douglas v. California. 54 There, the Court reviewed California’s system of
having a trial judge review the trial record to determine “‘whether it would
be of advantage to the defendant or helpful to the appellate court to have
counsel appointed.’” 55 Again, equal protection was the theme: “where the
merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided
without benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been
drawn between rich and poor.” 56 But due process played an important
role; having a court screen to determine whether appellate review was
warranted deprived the defendant of “[a]ny real chance” of uncovering
“hidden merit.” 57 “Hidden merit” is an important concept here; the
difficulties with Anders arise primarily when the basis for reversal on
appeal is not patent.
B.

The Seminal Decision in Anders

Four years after first recognizing in Douglas a constitutional right to
appellate counsel in appeals of right, another California case spawned the
Court’s decision in Anders. 58 The Court in Anders struggled to capture, in
concrete terms, what the right to counsel actually means. The decision is

51. Id. at 18; see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 292 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(“When a State elects to provide appellate review, . . . the terms on which It does so are subject to
constitutional notice.”). The universal right of appeal is beyond the scope of this article, but my
colleague Cassandra Burke Robertson has addressed it. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to
Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219 (2013) (advocating for recognition of fundamental right to appeal); see
also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 21-1.1(a) (2d ed. 1980) (“The possibility of appellate
review of trial court judgments should exist for every criminal conviction. It is undesirable to have
any class of case in which such trial court determinations are unreviewable.”).
52. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18.
53. Id. at 19.
54. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
55. Id. at 355 (quoting California v. Hyde, 331 P.2d 42, 43 (Cal. 1958)).
56. Id. at 357 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 356.
58. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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confusing and internally inconsistent. And it ushered in an era of
confusion that continues to this day.
Charles Anders was stopped for an ordinary traffic violation. After
seeing a “package fly out of the car,” the police officer searched the car
and discovered marijuana. 59 He was eventually convicted of felony
possession of marijuana in a California state court. 60
On appeal, Anders’ lawyer wrote a letter to the California appellate
court representing “that there was no merit to the appeal.”61 Anders then
“requested the appointment of another attorney,” which the appellate
court denied. 62 Left with no other option, he pursued his appeal pro se, 63
and the appellate court affirmed his conviction. 64 That opinion addressed
his counsel’s withdrawal in a single sentence, highlighting counsel’s
conclusion that the appeal had no merit. 65 There was no mention of
Anders’ request for replacement counsel. And there was no discussion of
the constitutional significance of his counsel’s withdrawal or of the public
disparagement of the merits of his client’s appeal.
The Supreme Court reversed. Having recognized in Douglas the
right to appellate counsel in a state-court criminal appeal, 66 the Court’s
decision turns heavily on what that right actually means: “The
constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process can
only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in
behalf of his client, as opposed to that of amicus curiae.” 67 So holding, the
Court had no trouble concluding that “California’s procedure did not
furnish petitioner with counsel acting in the role of an advocate[,] nor did
it provide that full consideration and resolution of the matter as is obtained
when counsel is acting in that capacity.” 68
So what does it mean to be an advocate? The Court explained that an
advocate must “support his client’s appeal to the best of his ability.” 69 Fair

59. People v. Anders, 333 P.2d 854, 855–56 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959), rev’d, 386 U.S. 738.
60. Anders, 386 U.S. at 739.
61. Id. at 740.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Anders, 333 P.2d at 856.
65. Id. at 855 (“The attorney who was appointed by this court to assist him on appeal has
informed the court and the defendant that he finds no merit therein.”).
66. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
67. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 (emphasis added); see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 276–
77 (2000) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956)) (equal-protection and due-process
concerns “largely converge to require that a State’s procedure ‘afford[] adequate and effective
appellate review to indigent defendants.’” (emphasis added)).
68. Anders, 386 U.S. at 743.
69. Id. at 744.
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enough, but what if counsel has no such ability? What if the facts and
procedural history of the case support no appellate argument? That was
apparently the conclusion Anders’ counsel had reached in informing the
California court that the appeal had “no merit.” 70
To accommodate those circumstances, the Court left counsel an
option for cases that counsel believes are “wholly frivolous.” 71 Counsel
must first perform “a conscientious examination” of the record before
making that determination. 72 Then, if counsel so concludes, “he should so
advise the court and request permission to withdraw.” 73 But there was a
catch in the original Anders formulation: the request to withdraw had to
be “accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might
arguably support the appeal,” 74 including “references not only to the
record, but also to [apposite] legal authorities.” 75 The Court defended this
requirement as a means of providing the client with “that advocacy which
a nonindigent defendant is able to obtain.” 76
Of course, it is difficult to fathom how there can be anything in the
record that might arguably support an appeal that is wholly frivolous.
Justice Stewart’s dissent pointed out that “if the record did present any
such ‘arguable’ issues, the appeal would not be frivolous[,] and counsel
would not have filed a ‘no-merit’ letter in the first place.” 77 He
characterized this as a “quixotic requirement” premised on the “cynical
assumption that an appointed lawyer’s professional representation to an
appellate court in a ‘no-merit’ letter is not to be trusted.” 78
The Court built into the Anders briefing process two additional
provisions designed to protect the client. First, “[a] copy of counsel’s brief
should be furnished the indigent and time allowed him to raise any points
that he chooses.” 79 Second, the appellate court “then proceeds, after a full
examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly
frivolous.” 80 If the court, having conducted its review, agrees with
counsel, it may grant the motion to withdraw and dispose of the case as
state law requires. 81 But if it disagrees with counsel’s assessment, the
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

People v. Anders, 333 P.2d 854, 855 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 745.
Id.
Id. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 744 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
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court “must, prior to decision, afford the indigent the assistance of counsel
to argue the appeal.” 82
C.

Post-Anders Clarification from the Supreme Court on the Right to
Appellate Counsel in the Context of Arguably Frivolous Appeals

In the fifty-three years since Anders, the Court has decided at least
five cases that hinge on the Anders holding. This subsection chronicles
the evolution of the Anders holding through the lenses of these evolving
cases. 83
1. Jones v. Barnes
It was not until 1983, some fifteen years after deciding Anders, that
the Court had occasion to revisit the Anders holding. And the decision,
Jones v. Barnes, 84 did not involve a lawyer’s request to withdraw. Instead,
the defendant in Jones challenged his appellate counsel’s refusal to raise
specified issues on appeal. 85 Jones thus had appellate counsel, but he
argued that his counsel was ineffective for not arguing the case according
to his direction. 86 The Second Circuit, on review of a federal habeas
petition, agreed with Jones and held that “since Anders bars counsel from
abandoning a nonfrivolous appeal, it also bars counsel from abandoning a
nonfrivolous issue on appeal.” 87
The Court reversed, clarifying that counsel is not required to raise
particular issues on appeal if in her professional judgment there is no value
in doing so—even when the client demands otherwise, and even when the
issues are not themselves frivolous. 88 “Neither Anders nor any decision of
this Court suggests . . . that the indigent defendant has a constitutional
right to compel appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous points requested
by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment, decides not
to present those points.” 89 Such a requirement would “seriously

82. Id.
83. In addition to the cases that address Anders directly, the Court has also decided a civil case
that rejected a claim against a state-employed public defender who, by not abiding by the Anders
procedure, allegedly deprived a defendant of his constitutional rights. See Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454
U.S. 312 (1981).
84. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
85. Id. at 749.
86. Id. at 749–50.
87. Id. at 750.
88. Id. at 751.
89. Id.
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undermine[] the ability of counsel to present the client’s case in accord
with counsel’s professional evaluation.” 90
The Jones decision rests on notions of effective appellate advocacy
and power allocation as between lawyer and client. Effective appellate
advocacy, the Court held, is not measured purely by the ability to
articulate issues, but also by the judgment to select among them.
“Experienced advocates since time beyond memory have emphasized the
importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing
on one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues.” 91
But implicit in the majority decision is the allocation of power to the
lawyer to make the ultimate selection. And Justice Brennan found fault
with that premise: “The import of words like ‘assistance’ and ‘counsel’
seems inconsistent with a regime under which counsel appointed by the
State to represent a criminal defendant can refuse to raise issues with
arguable merit on appeal when his client, after hearing his assessment of
the case and his advice, has directed him to raise them.” 92 He further
explained that “[t]he right to counsel . . . is not an all-or-nothing right,
under which a defendant must choose between forgoing the assistance of
counsel altogether or relinquishing control over every aspect of his case
beyond its most basic structure . . . .” 93
2. Pennsylvania v. Finley
The Court’s second Anders clarification came in 1987 and requires
little attention here. In Pennsylvania v. Finley,94 the Court refused to apply
the Anders rule to an appeal from an unsuccessful collateral attack on a
conviction. The Court explained that it had “never held that prisoners have
a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon
their convictions, and we decline to so hold today.” 95 The case, then,
offers no guidance on proper application of the Anders procedure; it
merely limits the circumstances in which the Constitution requires such a
procedure, which under Finley applies only to direct appeals.

90. Id.
91. Id. at 751–52 (1983) (citing Justice Robert Jackson, Advocacy Before the Supreme Court,
25 TEMPLE L.Q. 115, 119 (1951)); see also Fifth Third Mortg. Co. v. Chic. Title Ins. Co., 692 F.3d
507, 509 (6th Cir. 2012) (“When a party comes to us with nine grounds for reversing the district court,
that usually means there are none.”).
92. Jones, 463 U.S. at 755–56 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 759; see also id. at 764 (“I cannot accept the notion that lawyers are one of the
punishments a person receives merely for being accused of a crime.”).
94. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
95. Id. at 555.
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3. McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin
McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 96 decided in 1988, was the
third case clarifying Anders and the first to take up a state-court deviation
from the process the Court had established for assessing a motion to
withdraw. The Wisconsin rule at issue in McCoy required an attorney
seeking to withdraw to file an Anders brief with an additional requirement
not found in Anders; Wisconsin required counsel to identify not only the
arguable issues, but also “‘a discussion of why’” they “‘lack[ed] merit.’” 97
The Wisconsin Public Defender refused to comply with the latter
requirement of the rule, arguing that it would be “unethical and contrary
to Anders” to have to argue against his own client. 98
The Supreme Court upheld the Wisconsin rule. In doing so, it
recognized that an Anders brief is not a “typical advocate’s brief,” which
normally has “as its sole purpose the persuasion of the court to grant relief
to the defendant.” 99 An Anders brief is instead designed to assure the court
that the indigent defendant’s constitutional rights have not been
violated.” 100 It therefore has a different purpose and places on the
appellate court “two interrelated tasks.” 101 First, the court “must satisfy
itself that the attorney has provided the client with a diligent and thorough
search of the record for any arguable claim that might support the client’s
appeal.” 102 Second, the court “must determine whether counsel has
correctly concluded that the appeal is frivolous.” 103
With these tasks in mind, the Court upheld Wisconsin’s “why”
requirement because it “merely requires that the attorney go one step
further” than the procedure described in Anders itself. 104 “Instead of
relying on an unexplained assumption that the attorney has discovered law
or facts that completely refute the arguments identified in the brief, the
Wisconsin court requires additional evidence of counsel’s diligence.” 105
The Court construed this requirement as an “additional safeguard against
mistaken conclusions by counsel that the strongest arguments he or she

96. McCoy v. Ct. of App. of Wisc., 486 U.S. 429 (1988).
97. Id. at 430 (quoting WIS. R. APP. P. 809.32) (emphasis added); see also id. at 429 (requiring
counsel “to discuss why each issue raised lack[s] merit” is a “depart[ure] from Anders.”).
98. Id. at 432.
99. Id. at 442.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45 (1967).
105. McCoy, 486 U.S. at 442.
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can find are frivolous.” 106 Astonishingly, the Court held that this process
amounted to “precisely the services that an affluent defendant could
obtain from paid counsel—a thorough review of the record and a
discussion of the strongest arguments revealed by that review.” 107
Apparently, the Court was not bothered by the reality that counsel
for affluent clients do not normally advise the court and the prosecution
that she thinks the appeal is frivolous, much less the reasons for that view.
Justice Brennan took up that torch: “The Court today,” he wrote in dissent,
“reneges on . . . longstanding assurances [to criminal defendants] by
permitting a State to force its appointed defender of the indigent to
advocate against his client upon unilaterally concluding that the client’s
appeal lacks merit.” 108 The “why” requirement, he explained, turns the
lawyer into “a friend of the court whose advocacy is so damning that the
prosecutor never responds,” 109 effectively amounting to client
abandonment. 110
Eventually, in its 2000 decision in Smith v. Robbins, the Court
acknowledged that the Wisconsin rule “probably made a court more likely
to rule against the indigent than if the court had simply received an Anders
brief.” 111 Even with that recognition, however, the Smith Court reaffirmed
the McCoy holding. 112
4. Penson v. Ohio
Penson v. Ohio, 113 decided one term after McCoy, was the fourth
Supreme Court case clarifying the Anders holding. But Penson tread no
new ground; the case was “remarkably similar” to Anders and therefore
required of the Court “a similar answer.” 114
The lawyer in Penson filed a motion to withdraw, along with a
conclusory “certification” that he had “carefully reviewed” the record,
that he had “found no errors requiring reversal,” and that he would not file

106. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 443 (“If an attorney can advise the court of his or her
conclusion that an appeal is frivolous without impairment of the client’s fundamental rights, it must
follow that no constitutional deprivation occurs when the attorney explains the basis for that
conclusion.”).
107. Id. at 444.
108. Id. at 445 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 455.
110. Id.
111. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 272–73 (2000).
112. See id. at 284 (reaffirming that Wisconsin requirement “affords adequate and effective
appellate review for criminal indigents”).
113. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988).
114. See id. at 77.
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a “meritless appeal.” 115 The Ohio appellate court granted that motion
without first reviewing the record.116 It then conducted an independent
review and concluded that there was, in fact, error—not only arguable
error, but an instance of plain error that warranted a partial reversal.117
Instead of appointing new appellate counsel to argue all of the issues it
identified on its independent review, the Ohio court decided those issues,
mostly against the defendant, based only on its own review with no
advocate for the defendant. 118
The Supreme Court held that the Ohio court had not followed the
Anders procedures in several respects. First, the Ohio court erred “when
it granted appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw” because counsel’s
certification did not comply with the Anders briefing requirement; 119
indeed, it was no better than the letter counsel had sent to the Court in
Anders. The Ohio court also erred in granting the motion before
conducting its own independent review of the record; “the Court of
Appeals should not have acted on the motion to withdraw before it made
its own examination of the record to determine whether counsel’s
evaluation of the case was sound.” 120 And, “[m]ost significantly,” it erred
after determining that there were nonfrivolous issues for appeal by
deciding those issues without appointing new counsel. 121
5. Smith v. Robbins
The Court’s most recent guidance on how to apply Anders came in
2000. In Smith v. Robbins, 122 the Court, in a five-to-four decision,
endorsed a California procedure that differed from Anders in significant
ways. That procedure, first announced by the California Supreme Court
in People v. Wende, 123 did not require counsel to state that an appeal was
frivolous or to seek leave to withdraw. Instead, the California procedure
instructed counsel to provide a summary of the case but to remain “silent
on the merits.” 124 Counsel was also required to explain the position to the
115. Id. at 78.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 79.
118. Id. at 81.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 82–83.
121. Id. at 83.
122. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000). Between its decisions in Penson and Smith, the
Court also held that Anders does not require a party to petition to the U.S. Supreme Court following
an adverse appellate decision. See Austin v. United States, 513 U.S. 5 (1994).
123. People v. Wende, 600 P.2d 1071 (Cal. 1979).
124. Smith, 528 U.S. at 265.
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client, advise the client of the right to file a supplemental brief pro se, and
“express[] his availability to brief any issues on which the court might
desire briefing.” 125 The California appellate court would then review the
entire record and either affirm or, if it identified an issue of possible merit,
call for further briefing. 126
One of the major questions in Smith was whether state courts were
required to follow the Anders procedure precisely or whether they were
free to fashion alternative methods of addressing arguably frivolous
appeals. The Court took the latter route, reaffirming its “established
practice of permitting the States within the broad bounds of the
Constitution to experiment with solutions to difficult questions of policy”
rather than confining the states in a “straitjacket.” 127 The Court placed its
trust in the “‘laboratory of the States in the first instance’” to craft
appropriate procedures, rather than imposing a national mandatory one. 128
I will come back, in a discussion below, to the significance this aspect of
the Smith holding may have on the flexibility available to federal appellate
courts applying Anders. 129
Having endorsed California’s right to forge its own method of
meeting the Anders objectives, the Court then examined whether
California’s procedure did so. But it first offered an evolved description
of what those objectives are—”to ensure that those indigents whose
appeals are not frivolous receive the counsel and merits brief required by
Douglas, and also to enable the State to ‘protect itself so that frivolous
appeals are not subsidized and public moneys not needlessly spent.’” 130
The focus on the misuse of public money had never before appeared in a
Court opinion in the line of cases leading to Anders or later construing it.
With the Anders objective now tempered by monetary costs, the Court
emphasized that the right to appellate counsel “does not include the right

125. Id.
126. Id.; see also id. at 265 (quoting Wende, 600 P.2d at 1074–75) (“The appellate court, upon
receiving a ‘Wende brief,’ must ‘conduct a review of the entire record,’ regardless of whether the
defendant has filed a pro se brief. The California Supreme Court in Wende required such a thorough
review notwithstanding a dissenting Justice’s argument that it was unnecessary and exceeded the
review that a court performs under Anders.”).
127. Id. at 272–73.
128. Id. at 275 (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990)
(O’Connor, J., concurring)). One law student has nevertheless suggested that non-uniform standards
for applying Anders raise equal-protection concerns. See Fazekas, supra note 11, at 594–96.
129. See infra § V.
130. Smith, 528 U.S. at 277–78 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 24 (1956) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring)).
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to bring a frivolous appeal and, concomitantly, does not include the right
to counsel for bringing a frivolous appeal.” 131
The Court then endorsed the California procedure, explaining that it
was preferable to Anders in two respects. First, the procedure reflected a
good-faith effort to “mitigate” the ethical problem for counsel by not
requiring counsel “to raise legal issues and by not requiring counsel to
explicitly describe the case as frivolous.” 132 Second, the Court
acknowledged the oxymoronic nature of “suggesting that an appeal could
be both ‘wholly frivolous’ and at the same time contain arguable
issues,” 133 which implied that there were “gradations of frivolity” and that
there were “two different meanings for the phrase ‘arguable issue.’”134
The California procedure, the Court held, “attempts to resolve this
problem . . . by drawing the line at frivolity and by defining arguable
issues as those that are not frivolous.” 135
Justice Souter, writing for the four dissenters, would have rejected
the California procedure because the required brief made no attempt to
advocate on behalf of the client. He explained that the appellate court’s
independent review of the record “could never compensate for the
lawyer’s failure of advocacy.” 136 He candidly acknowledged that “there is
no perfect place to draw the line between” a lawyer’s conflicting
obligations of duty to the client and candor to the court. 137 But depriving
the client of any advocacy at all, he warned, ran the risk of a lawyer’s
“relax[ing] his partisan instinct.” 138 The majority opinion suggested that
on balance it was better to have no argument from counsel than argument
that suggested the appeal was frivolous and can thereby “subtly
undermine the independence and thoroughness” of the court’s
independent review of the record.” 139
III. APPLICATION OF ANDERS IN THE FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS
The history chronicled above demonstrates that Anders, its
precursors, and its Supreme Court progeny all involved the constitutional
right to competent counsel in state-court proceedings. The requirement of

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 278.
Id. at 282.
Id. (quoting Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 294 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 292.
Id. at 294.
Id. at 284.
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competent counsel in federal prosecutions has never been in doubt; it was
enshrined from the outset in the Sixth Amendment. 140 And the Supreme
Court itself has never addressed the applicability of Anders in the context
of federal appeals. But there was, even before Anders, a skeletal
understanding that appointed counsel could not simply withdraw from
appellate representation without assuring the court that doing so would
not compromise the defendant’s rights.
The federal history has its roots in the federal statute that authorizes
a criminal defendant who cannot afford litigation expenses to pursue an
appeal in forma pauperis. 141 A defendant who qualifies is entitled not only
to relief from filing fees and transcript costs, but also to appointment of
appellate counsel. 142 Appellate counsel’s fee in such circumstances “shall
not exceed $5,000.” 143 But by statute a trial court may deny a defendant
the right to proceed in forma pauperis “if the trial court certifies in writing
that it is not taken in good faith.” 144 So the same trial court that issued the
judgment of conviction has the statutory power to deprive the convicted
defendant of access to the appellate process. The statute also provides that
an appellate court “shall dismiss the case” if it determines that the appeal
is “frivolous.” 145
In 1957, the Court held that the statutory language does not permit a
court to deprive a defendant of the right of appeal without “the aid of
counsel,” even where the trial court has certified that the appeal lacks the
requisite good faith. 146 The following year, the Court held that “[t]he
good-faith test must not be converted into a requirement of a preliminary
showing of any particular degree of merit.” 147 It explained that counsel
must act as an advocate for the client; it rejected the work of counsel who,
in confirming the absence of a good-faith basis for appeal, “performed
essentially the role of amici curiae.” 148 Foreshadowing its eventual
holding in Anders, the Court allowed for the possibility of withdrawal
140. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the
assistance of counsel for his defense.”).
141. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2018) (originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1915,
62 Stat. 869, 954–55).
142. See id. § 1915(e)(1). The statute has been amended several times, but its pertinent
provisions are the same today as they were at the time of the Supreme Court decisions herein cited.
143. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(2) (2018).
144. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
145. Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
146. Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565, 566 (1957); see also Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (“In the federal courts, . . . an indigent must be afforded counsel on appeal
whenever he challenges a certification that the appeal is not taken in good faith.”).
147. Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958).
148. Id. at 675.
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only after the court first ensures that permitting withdrawal would not
compromise the client’s rights:
If counsel is convinced, after conscientious investigation, that the appeal
is frivolous, of course, he may ask to withdraw on that account. If the
court is satisfied that counsel has diligently investigated the possible
grounds of appeal, and agrees with counsel’s evaluation of the case, then
leave to withdraw may be allowed and leave to appeal may be denied. 149

The Court reaffirmed these holdings in Anders. 150 These holdings also
align with the American Bar Association’s 1980 criminal-justice
standards. 151
With that backdrop, the federal circuit courts began applying Anders
in assessing requests to withdraw—some almost immediately after the
Anders decision. 152 Six months after Anders, for example, the District of
Columbia Circuit rejected a “brief filed by counsel appointed by this court
to represent appellant” that “was in fact a brief against appellant.” 153 In
that case, appellate counsel presented a brief listing eight questions
identified by his client followed by “a discussion whose manifest thrust is
to show there is no substance in the contention.” 154 The circuit procedure,
adopted before Anders and obliquely criticized in the Anders opinion, 155
called for an “amicus memorandum” to be provided “only to the court,”
not to the Government, 156 although counsel in that case had “transmitted”
it to the Government, and the Government had “adopted” it. 157 Invoking
Anders, the D.C. Circuit held that a “brief like that filed by counsel in this
149. Id.; see also Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 282 (1964) (holding that appellate
counsel who did not participate in trial must order and review transcript before determining whether
appeal can proceed in good faith).
150. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 741 (1967) (“Indeed, in the federal courts, the advice
of counsel has long been required whenever a defendant challenges a certification that an appeal is
not taken in good faith, and such representation must be in the role of an advocate, rather than as
amicus curiae.” (citations omitted)).
151. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 51, at § 21–2.4(a) (“Requirement of a trial court’s certificate
as a condition of appellate review is inconsistent with the principle of the right to appeal. If the
decisions to refuse a certificate are not final but can be reviewed by the appellate courts, transition of
cases to the appellate courts is made unnecessarily complex and the burden on the appellate courts is
increased.”).
152. See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, 442 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1971); Suggs v. United States,
391 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
153. Suggs, 391 F.2d at 972 (emphasis added).
154. Id.
155. See id. at 973 (quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 n.3).
156. Id. at 974. The D.C. Circuit practice still requires counsel to file the memorandum and
serve it on his client “but not on government counsel.” D.C. CIR. HANDBOOK, supra note 18,
§ VI(D)(2), at 26.
157. Id.
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case is not constitutionally adequate, even though the court purports to
review the record independently. Counsel may not ‘brief his case against
his client.’” 158 Other circuits have found similar fault with counsel’s
submissions when they found themselves unable to craft a merit brief
advocating for reversal. 159
By 2019, the federal appellate courts were regularly invoking the
Anders standards in decisions posted to Westlaw around 600 times a year,
sometimes more. 160 And the nature of Anders-based dispositions suggests
that many of them are not captured in reported decisions that find their
ways to searchable databases. When the Supreme Court observed in 2000
that counsel rely on Anders briefs “[n]ot infrequently,” 161 it presumably
meant in state-court cases, where the Anders line of cases originated. But
the same can be said of the application of Anders in the federal system.
Indeed, federal appellate courts have developed a robust set of rules,
guidelines, and precedential decisions governing Anders briefing in their
respective circuits. 162 And the federalization of criminal conduct often
associated with poverty 163 helps explain why federal circuit courts are
seeing large numbers of cases involving appointed counsel, many of
whom eventually seek to withdraw.
158. Id. at 973; see also id. at 974 (“It is one thing for a prisoner to be told that appointed counsel
sees no way to help him, and quote another for him to feel sandbagged when the counsel appointed
by one arm of the Government seems to be helping another to seal his doom.”). The effect of counsel’s
improper submission permeated the eventual merits decision, which invoked the prior filings by the
defendant’s former counsel, to hold that most of the assigned errors “do not merit any comment.”
Suggs v. United States, 407 F.2d 1272, 1275, 1278 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Griffy, 895 F.2d 561, 562 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting “a brief that
summarized the proceedings in the district court, recited the facts of the case, and stated that counsel
had reviewed the record and ‘located no specific issues’ for appeal” without “say[ing] the appeals
were frivolous and [moving] to withdraw.”); United States v. Edwards, 777 F.2d 364, 365 (7th Cir.
1985) (“Since, speaking realistically, a criminal defendant who has money will always be able to
persuade some lawyer to prosecute an appeal for him, parity—or, again speaking realistically, an
approximation to parity—between criminal defendants who do and those who do not have monetary
means requires that the appointed counsel who wants to withdraw not leave his client wholly in the
lurch, which is the practical consequence of the ‘no merit’ letter.”).
160. A Westlaw search in the database of all federal circuit courts in 2019 using the search
phrase “anders /p (frivolous nonfrivolous non-frivolous) /p withdraw! % habeas” returned 555 cases.
The same search returned 607 cases for 2018, 593 cases for 2017, 726 cases for 2016, and 652 cases
for 2016.
161. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 264 (2000).
162. See 1ST CIR. R. 46.6(c)(4); 2D CIR. R. 4.1(b); 3D CIR. R. 109.2; 6TH CIR. R. 12(c)(4)(C);
7TH CIR. R. 51(b); 8TH CIR. R. 27B(b); 9TH CIR. R. 4-1(C); 10TH CIR. R. 46.4(B)(1)-(3); 11TH CIR.
R. 27-1(A)(8); 4th Cir. CJA Representation, supra note 18; 5th Cir. Anders Guidelines, supra note
18; D.C. CIR. HANDBOOK, supra note 18; SEVENTH CIR. PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 19;
United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Griffy, 895 F.2d 561, 562
(9th Cir. 1990); Suggs v. United States, 392 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
163. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE PROBLEMS THAT ANDERS CREATED
In his dissenting opinion in Smith, Justice Souter explained that
Anders “contemplates two reviews of the record, each of a markedly
different character.” 164 The first review comes from “the advocate,”
whose “job is to identify the best issues the partisan eye can spot.” 165 The
second review is “judicial review from a disinterested judge, who asks
two questions: whether the lawyer really did function as a committed
advocate, and whether he misjudged the legitimate appealability of any
issue.” 166
The concept is perhaps simple enough to articulate in that fashion.
But it presents significant problems at both stages—for the lawyer, for the
court, and for the defendant. This section explains those problems.
A.

Problems for Appellate Counsel

Under Anders, the first review of the appellate record comes from
the counsel appointed to represent the defendant on appeal. The result of
this review—the lawyer’s report to the court about it—is a pivotal
moment in the decision whether the lawyer will function as an advocate
for the client or an advisor to the court. Judge Richard Posner, writing for
the Seventh Circuit, noted that “[m]ost of the case law” under Anders
“concerns the adequacy of the brief that the lawyer is required to file in
support of the motion, identifying the grounds that he might have raised
in an appeal brief and explaining why they are frivolous.” 167 The adequacy
or inadequacy is a direct function of the bind that a lawyer can find herself
in when tasked to represent a client on appeal if she is unable to identify
a good-faith argument for reversal.
The Third Circuit has explained that the “dual duties of counsel in
the Anders situation” are: “(1) to satisfy the court that he or she has
thoroughly scoured the record in search of appealable issues; and (2) to
explain why the issues are frivolous.” 168 The Seventh Circuit has
embodied these concepts in a practitioner’s handbook. 169 But this task
presents several significant challenges for counsel.
164. Smith, 528 U.S. at 295 (Souter, J., dissenting).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 551 (7th Cir. 1996).
168. United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 2000).
169. 7TH CIR. PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 19, § XVII(C), at 117 (citing United
States v. Edwards, 777 F.2d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1985)). Note that the Third and Seventh Circuits’
articulation of the standard, similar to the standard addressed by the Supreme Court in McCoy,
includes the “why” component. See supra notes 97–112 and accompanying text (discussing McCoy
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1. Distinguishing Between “Frivolous” and Merely “Meritless”
The Supreme Court understands that the Anders procedure has been
criticized as “incoherent and thus impossible to follow.” 170 How can an
appeal “be both ‘wholly frivolous’ and at the same time contain arguable
issues”? 171 An arguable issue is, by definition, “‘not frivolous.’” 172 In that
sense, “the Anders procedure appears to adopt gradations of frivolity and
to use two different meanings for the phrase ‘arguable issue.’”173 The peril
for lawyers is that an argument that rises to the level of “frivolous” would
constitute an ethical violation, 174 although the ethical rules are somewhat
relaxed in the criminal context.175
Lawyers are trained to make the best arguments they can from the
facts provided and the applicable law. Litigation by definition involves
winners and losers; on the front end, lawyers are expected to understand
the strengths and weaknesses of their case and explain their assessments
to their clients. Most cases lie between the end points of the strong-toweak continuum; just as no lawyer can ever assure a client that victory is
certain (for example, in seeking to overturn a conviction), so too is it rare
to be certain that victory is so unlikely as to rise to the level of frivolity,
particularly after a lengthy trial. 176

v. Ct. App. of Wisc., 486 U.S. 429, 430 (1988)). That component is not found in Anders itself. See
generally Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
170. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 282 (2000).
171. Id.
172. Id. (quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at 744).
173. Id. (quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at 744); see also Robert Hermann, Frivolous Criminal
Appeals, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 701, 705 (1972) (“[Anders] is seen as having established a rarefied
distinction between appeals [that] are merely meritless and those [that] are wholly frivolous. Under
Anders, so interpreted, the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel assures
representation to criminal appellants for meritless, but not for frivolous, appeals.”).
174. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L COND. r. 3.1; see also infra notes 189–195 and
accompanying text.
175. “The lawyer’s obligations under this Rule are subordinate to federal or state constitutional
law that entitles a defendant in a criminal matter to the assistance of counsel in presenting a claim or
contention that otherwise would be prohibited by this Rule.” Id. cmt. 3; see also State v. Sims, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107724, 2019–Ohio–4975, ¶ 65–69 (Boyle, J., dissenting) (arguing that counsel’s
risk of ethical problem is low).
176. See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 600 F.3d 897, 898 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States
v. Edwards, 777 F.2d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[I]t seems improbable that in those [transcript] pages
or elsewhere in the pretrial proceedings there is nothing at all that ‘a court or another lawyer might
conceivably think worth citing to the appellate court as a possible ground of error.’”)); see also 7TH
CIR. PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 102 (“Attorneys who file an Anders motion in a
case that was tried . . . should pay particular attention to the court’s discussion in [Palmer], reminding
counsel that the court must have confidence that counsel thoroughly evaluated the record before the
court will let the lawyer guide the court’s review of the appeal.”).
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Reasonable lawyers can certainly disagree on the strength of an
appeal. It follows, then, that reasonable lawyers (and judges) can (and do)
disagree on whether an appeal is frivolous.177 Requiring an appointed
lawyer to make that determination, particularly on a question that lends
itself to such subjectivity, is perilous for any lawyer who cares about her
clients and who does not wish to be the subject of a published opinion
criticizing her judgment. 178 On the other hand, some lawyers would be
inclined to pursue even frivolous appeals to avoid the risk of ineffective
representation—and then pass the buck to the court, through an Anders
submission, to avoid having to make the ultimate judgment call
themselves.
2. Having to Advocate Against the Client
“In the relationship with a client, the lawyer is required above all to
demonstrate loyalty.” 179 But the Anders procedure can require a lawyer to
abandon her client’s interest as the price for extricating herself from a case
she feels uncomfortable briefing. Anders requires the lawyer to
affirmatively represent that an appeal is frivolous; she must “advise the
court” that she has drawn that very conclusion. 180 As Justice Brennan
explained, a lawyer seeking to withdraw “must announce to the court that
will rule on a client’s appeal that he or she believes the client has no
case.” 181 The Seventh and Third Circuits have specifically rejected Anders
briefs that did not include that representation. 182
To be sure, there are variations of Anders that lessen the requirement
that a lawyer turn against her client. Under the California procedure at
issue in Smith, counsel does not “explicitly state[] that his review has led
177. See, e.g., Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 91 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“As it
turned out, [counsel’s] determination [that an appeal was frivolous] was incorrect, but this fact does
not mean that counsel did not employ his legal talents in the service of his client.”); see also 6th Cir.
Notes, supra note 19, at 3 (“[A]n attorney’s sense that the defendant/appellant will ultimately not
prevail does not necessarily mean that the appeal is wholly frivolous.”).
178. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 174 F.3d 900, 902 (7th Cir. 1999) (chastising counsel
for “repeated failures to comply with proper Anders procedures”); United States v. Burnett, 989 F.2d
100, 104 (2d Cir. 1993) (describing inadequate Anders submission as a “dereliction of duty”).
179. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis, 1
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 15, 21 (1987).
180. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
181. McCoy v. Ct. of App. of Wisc., 486 U.S. 429, 447 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
182. United States v. Tabb, 125 F.3d 583, 585 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The problem with the Anders
brief in this case is not what it says, but what it does not say . . . . [I]t gives no indication that counsel
has determined, following a proper examination of the record, that there is no nonfrivolous basis for
the appeal.”); see also United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780–81 (3d Cir. 2000) (adopting Tabb
holding).
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him to conclude that an appeal would be frivolous,” but the courts
understand that the frivolousness conclusion is “implicit.” 183 Similarly,
the Eighth Circuit has criticized an Anders brief that is not “done as an
advocate.” 184 But that Eighth Circuit decision seemed to suggest that
counsel was required to file a full merits appeal; it offered no alternative
to the Anders procedure that would have permitted counsel to withdraw.
More typical is the Seventh Circuit’s approach, which is to reject an
Anders brief that reads “as though [the issues] had merit,” even if counsel
advances those arguments “only because his client requested that he do
so.” 185 The Seventh Circuit instead insists on an “Anders brief explaining
why any potential arguments have no merit.” 186
Justice Brennan wanted a clear rule: “When counsel has nothing
further to say in the client’s defense, he or she should say no more.” 187
But Anders does not allow for that clear approach. It does not allow for
silence. The Anders process requires counsel, explicitly or implicitly, to
represent that he has no faith in the merits of the client’s case. It is hard to
fathom how, in that context, counsel provides the client with the adequate
representation on appeal that the Constitution demands. In the words of
one Ohio appellate judge, “[w]hen appellate counsel files an Anders brief
saying, ‘My client should lose,’ appellate counsel undoubtedly prejudices
his or her client.” 188
3. Honoring the Duty of Candor to the Court
Competing directly with the duty of loyalty to the client is counsel’s
duty of candor to the court. 189 But “when a lawyer’s corresponding
obligations are at odds with each other, there is no perfect place to draw
the line between them.” 190 On appeal, “counsel must do his partisan best,
short of calling black white, to flag the points that come closest to being

183. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 265 (2000).
184. Robinson v. Black, 812 F.2d 1084, 1086–87 (8th Cir. 1987) (“Robinson had a right to
expect counsel to brief and argue his case to the best of counsel’s ability, showing the most favorable
side of the defendant’s arguments. Counsel changed the adversarial process into an inquisitorial one
by joining the forces of the state and working against his client.”).
185. United States v. Tabb, 125 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 1997).
186. Id.
187. McCoy v. Ct. of App. of Wisc., 486 U.S. 429, 449 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
188. State v. Sims, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107724, 2019–Ohio–4975, ¶ 60 (Boyle, J.,
dissenting).
189. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (duty not to advance position “unless there
is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous”); id. r. 3.3(a)(1) (duty not to make a “false
statement of fact” to tribunal); id. r 3.3(a)(2) (duty to disclose controlling authority).
190. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 292 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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appealable.” 191 A lawyer who can unearth no nonfrivolous argument for
appeal is thus faced with two untenable options: abandoning the loyalty
she owes the client or risking professional misconduct.
The argument is complicated once again by the challenge in defining
what constitutes “frivolous.” 192 We can all agree that failing to disclose
controlling authority, misrepresenting facts, or misstating the law are
improper under all circumstances.193 But arguments that lack sufficient
factual or legal support are also potentially frivolous, even if those
arguments do not involve outright misrepresentation; they may still
violate “the rule against trifling with the court.” 194
One appellate judge advocates amending the rules of professional
conduct to clarify that a merits brief in a criminal appeal is never frivolous
“so long as counsel does not misrepresent facts or law.” 195 The concept is
sound, and it may resolve the concerns about candor to the tribunal, but it
would not resolve the holistic problem. If contrary authority runs against
the defendant, disclosing it to the court may be just as problematic for the
client as characterizing the appeal as frivolous. And it still would require
to brief an appeal she does not believe in.
4. Exposing Counsel’s Mental Impressions
Related but distinct from the other problematic features of an
adequate Anders brief is the requirement that counsel provide a window
into her mental impressions as a predicate for obtaining leave to withdraw.
Comparing the Anders procedure to the usual appellate brief exposes the
problem.
In a normal scenario, in either a civil or a criminal appeal, the
appellant’s counsel identifies the various candidates for reversal and
makes strategic choices about which issues to raise. Typically, these are
choices informed by an assessment of the relative strength of the
arguments—but not always. Sometimes counsel will abandon an
argument with a substantial possibility for reversal if there are competing
considerations—such as creating an inconsistency with another argument
or for reasons extrinsic to the appeal itself. 196 For example, an argument
based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel can run counter to other
191. Id. at 295.
192. See supra notes 170–174 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 189.
194. Smith, 528 U.S. at 295.
195. Warner, supra note 10, at 665.
196. See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Lawyers should not blindly
assume that their clients will benefit from every legal contention, no matter the hazard . . . .”).
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arguments that depend on the portrayal of trial counsel as diligent and
effective. A tenuous argument to reverse a conviction may not integrate
well with another, stronger argument focusing on the length of the
sentence. An argument that a defendant’s remorse justified a lower
sentence may not be acceptable to a client who insists on his innocence.
And so on.
In the face of these considered choices by counsel in an ordinary
appeal, the court has no obligation to scrutinize them or to review the
record in search of unraised issues.197 Indeed, under Jones, courts afford
great deference to counsel’s selection of issues, so long as counsel pursues
at least one on the merits. 198 But under Anders, counsel who believes the
appeal is frivolous in its entirety is nevertheless required to articulate all
of the available arguments 199 and, depending on the court, also to explain
why they are frivolous. 200
This rule stands in stark contrast to protection we normally afford to
a lawyer’s sacrosanct mental impressions. For over eighty years, we have
accepted as canonic that “even the most liberal of discovery theories” does
not “justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental
impressions of an attorney.” 201 And yet we require appointed counsel
seeking to withdraw to do just that. We do so under the guise of protecting
the defendant’s constitutional rights, but of course the client in this
circumstance usually has no desire to see his counsel expose the client’s
hand in that fashion.
B.

Problems for the Appellate Court

Evaluating appointed counsel’s request to withdraw—that is,
determining whether a particular submission complies with the Anders
safeguards—has been a “continuing source of frustration for the appellate
judge.” 202 Part of the frustration stems from “a lack of uniformity in
internal court methods for handling Anders briefs” 203 These problems are
both procedural and substantive. They are procedural because the courts
197. Warner, supra note 10, at 635 (“[I]f at least one issue of arguable merit is raised, counsel
may exercise independent professional judgment and does not have to raise any other issues should
counsel deem other issues too weak to present a good chance for reversal.”).
198. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); see generally supra notes 84–93 and
accompanying text.
199. Id.; see Warner, supra note 10, at 634 (“[G]iven Anders, if counsel deems all of the issues
nonmeritorious, counsel must file a brief raising all issues of arguable merit.”).
200. See supra notes 97–107, 167–169 and accompanying text.
201. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947).
202. Warner, supra note 10, at 625.
203. Id. at 656.
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cannot agree on the right level of review of counsel’s submission and of
the record. They are substantive because that review, at whatever level,
implicates important constitutional protections that a cautious appellate
judge does not wish to compromise for the sake of expediency. The
challenges are so onerous that several states “have refused to adopt the
Anders [p]rocedure.” 204
A “disinterested judge” evaluating an Anders brief “asks two
questions: whether the lawyer really did function as a committed
advocate, and whether he misjudged the legitimate appealability of any
issue.” 205 Articulating these questions is easy enough; answering them
presents several challenges. 206 First, how is the appellate court supposed
to determine whether counsel acted as a sufficient advocate? Second, what
degree of review of the record should the appellate court conduct to test
the reliability of counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous? And
third, what should the court do if it disagrees with counsel’s assessment?
I treat each of these questions in turn.
1. Evaluating Counsel’s Competency in Submitting an Anders
Brief
The first problematic task an appellate court confronts in determining
whether to grant a request to withdraw under Anders is whether counsel’s
submission demonstrates an adequate assessment of the case. Some
commentators take the view that Anders speaks “solely [to] the manner in
which counsel communicates to the court the conclusion that the appeal
was meritless, not the conclusion itself.” 207 Ensuring an adequate brief is
critical; “there needs to be some reasonable assurance that the lawyer has
not relaxed his partisan instinct.” 208
So what is adequate? The circuits have attempted to define the term
in their apposite rules and guidelines, and the standard certainly demands
a brief that reflects a thorough review of the transcripts, which “is
necessary for the court to satisfy itself that counsel has been diligent in
examining the record for meritorious issues and that the appeal is indeed

204. Schmidt, supra note 8, at 207; see also Warner, supra note 10, at 642. In Ohio, which is
divided into appellate districts, three districts no longer allow Anders submissions, while the other
nine continue to accept them. See generally MARK P. PAINTER & ANDREW S. POLLIS, OHIO
APPELLATE PRACTICE § 5:27, at 277–78 (2019–20 ed.).
205. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 295 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
206. Warner, supra note 10, at 633 (“Anders . . . leads to inconsistency in the presentation of
issues to the appellate court, and this results in inconsistency in the method of review by the court.”).
207. Warner, supra note 10, at 632 (citing Junkin, supra note 6, at 188 (1988)).
208. Smith, 528 U.S. at 294 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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frivolous.” 209 But transcript review aside, determining the adequacy of
counsel’s assessment, based only on the brief filed by the lawyer who
seeks to withdraw, requires the court to place a high level of confidence
in the lawyer’s competency. An obviously insufficient brief in some ways
is easier to assess than one that appears facially adequate. 210 That begs the
question: what does “facially adequate” mean?
The Seventh Circuit suggests that “facially adequate” means “that
the brief appears to be a competent effort to determine whether the
defendant has any grounds for appealing.” 211 It “explains the nature of the
case[,] addresses the issues that a case of this kind might be expected to
involve” and contains an analysis that “appears to be thorough.” 212 The
Second Circuit appears to look for key objections and motions made at
trial and decided against the defendant. 213 The Fifth Circuit offers a moredetailed checklist of lower-court proceedings on which counsel should
focus in conducting a review of the record and even distinguishes between
guilty-plea cases and cases tried to a verdict.214 Justice Souter explained
there must be “some affirmative and express indicator that an advocate
has been at work, in the form of a product that an appellate court can
specifically review.” 215
This know-it-when-you-see-it standard 216 is a troubling foundation
on which to assess the constitutional rights of a defendant who has already
been convicted and is presumably incarcerated. It invites a high level of
deference, whether or not warranted, to the lawyer looking for relief from
an assignment. It rewards lawyers who write well at the expense of their

209. 7TH CIR. PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 19, § XIV(B), at 117; see also id. at 102
(“Counsel should be mindful that the transcripts are essential in the preparation of a motion to
withdraw based on Anders.”); 1ST CIR. R. 46.6(C)(4) (requiring counsel to have “ordered and read all
relevant transcripts”); 4th Cir. CJA Representation, supra note 18 (requiring counsel to “order the
complete record transcribed”); see also 7TH CIR. PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 19,
§ XIV(B), at 102 (“Counsel should be mindful that the transcripts are essential in the preparation of
a motion to withdraw based on Anders”); supra note 149. But see 11TH CIR. R. 27-1(a)(8) (requiring
counsel to ensure that the record contains transcripts of “relevant” proceedings).
210. See United States v. Tabb, 125 F.3d 583, 584 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Our starting point is the
Anders brief itself, which we review to see if it is adequate on its face.”).
211. United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
212. Id.
213. See United States v. Burnett, 989 F.2d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting Anders brief
“consisting solely of one and a half pages of argument [that] does not explain why neither the
objection to [an aspect of the trial evidence] nor the insufficiency of the evidence claims are now
frivolous grounds for an appeal.”).
214. 5th Cir. Anders Guidelines, supra note 18.
215. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 298 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
216. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (Stewart, J., concurring) (concluding that motion
picture did not meet the definition of pornography).
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clients; good writing can sometimes mask weak substance. And its
inherent subjectivity lends itself to different conclusions on the part of
different judges, depending on several factors, including their prior
familiarity with the lawyer’s work or reputation, their general willingness
to scrutinize the issues independently, and their philosophical
predisposition to find in favor or against a criminal defendant. 217
In some circumstances, of course, inadequacy is apparent on the face
of a submission. And courts that have rejected Anders submissions offer
some clues about what can constitute a deficiency. Among federal courts
that have weighed in on this topic, the Seventh Circuit has been
particularly prolific. That court insists on “sufficient indicia in the brief
that counsel has made a sound judgment.” 218 It has noted its suspicions of
unexpectedly short submissions 219 and has rejected briefs where the
“discussion” section “did not demonstrate that [counsel] looked at the
record and made an informed decision that no issues merited appeal.” 220
It also frowns on Anders briefs that raise only the sentencing decision as
an arguable issue for appeal after a lengthy trial: “So much can happen
during a [lengthy trial], and when presented with an Anders motion, we
are not free to assume that counsel combed the entire record but found
nothing else worth discussing.” 221 Finally, the court admonishes counsel
not only to summarize the evidence, but to “provide[] context” for it,
without which the “brief does not reflect the close scrutiny that we expect
from a lawyer who represents that her client’s appeal is frivolous.” 222
To be sure, the Seventh Circuit acknowledges the “broad discretion”
conferred on attorneys “to decide what matters to discuss in an Anders
brief.” 223 It also “emphasize[s] that counsel need not discuss every
possible issue.” 224 But the brief must leave the court satisfied that counsel

217. See, e.g., Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 312–13 (2013).
218. United States v. Tabb, 125 F.3d 583, 585 (7th Cir. 1997).
219. United States v. Fernandez, 174 F.3d 900, 901 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The argument section of
this brief is a mere three pages, which, rather than identifying potential issues for appeal, surveys the
proceedings from guilty plea to sentencing, and states bare conclusions that no error existed at any
stage of the proceedings.”); see also United States v. Burnett, 989 F.2d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 1993)
(submission “consisting solely of one and a half pages of argument is inadequate”).
220. Tabb, 125 F.3d at 585.
221. United States v. Palmer, 600 F.3d 897, 899 (7th Cir. 2010) (“It will be the unusual case
when a lawyer representing a defendant convicted at trial cannot identify anything but sentencing
issues to include in an Anders submission.”).
222. Id.; see also Tabb, 125 F.3d at 585 (rejecting conclusory statement of no prejudice to
defendant from events at trial that was unaccompanied by a “review of the events at trial”).
223. Tabb, 125 F.3d at 585.
224. Id.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss3/1

30

Pollis: Fixing the Broken System of Assessing Criminal Appeals for Frivolousness

2019]

FIXING THE BROKEN SYSTEM OF ASSESSING CRIMINAL APPEALS FOR FRIVOLOUSNESS 511

has “made a reasoned decision not to raise the issues he has omitted.”225
Indeed, selection of the issues is crucial, because, in Justice Stevens’
words, “bad judgment by the attorney in selecting the issues to raise might
divert the court’s attention from more meritorious, unmentioned
issues.” 226
Ironically, the better the brief, the higher the risk of adverse
consequences for the client; what benefits counsel and the court may not
benefit the party who presumably would prefer to have an advocate argue
forcefully for reversal. Perhaps to temper the inherent conflict, the
Seventh Circuit wants counsel to “sketch[] an argument for reversal,” in
order to spare the appellate court the task of “comb[ing] the entire record
looking for possible arguments that counsel missed.” 227 It even goes so
far as to suggest that counsel who provides such a sketch thereby satisfies
“the duty to be ‘an active advocate on behalf of his client.’” 228 But the
reality is that sketching out an argument, and then telling the court it is
frivolous—and, worse yet, explaining why it is frivolous 229—runs directly
counter to the client’s interest. In the end, then, courts like the Seventh
Circuit do more disservice to the defendant’s constitutional rights than
they do to uphold them.
2. Scope of Review when Presented with Anders Brief
The second major problem for an appellate court evaluating an
Anders submission is to determine how much of the record it must
independently review and how closely it must review it. “Just what is
‘enough’” court review in these circumstances “is not clear.” 230 Should
the appellate court review the entire record, regardless of the issues
counsel raises? The Seventh Circuit has acknowledged that “[l]anguage
in some opinions of the Supreme Court could . . . be taken to impose upon
us this task of fine tooth combing the record.” 231 But some courts,

225. Id.
226. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 284 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also
admonishes that “the task of writing out the reasons that support an initial opinion on a question of
law” can “lead[] to a conclusion that was not previously apparent.” Id. at 290.
227. United States v. Fernandez, 174 F.3d 900, 901 (7th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
228. See id. at 901 (quoting Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967)).
229. See McCoy v. Ct. of App. of Wisc., 486 U.S. 429, 430 (1988); United States v. Wagner,
103 F.3d 551, 551 (7th Cir. 1996).
230. People v. Wende, 600 P.2d 1071, 1076 (1979) (Clark, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at 742); see also Wagner, 103 F.3d at 552 (“Less explored, and the
focus of this opinion, is how deeply we appellate judges must explore the record in the district court
in order to determine whether to grant the motion.”).
231. Wagner, 103 F.3d at 552.
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including the Seventh Circuit, find it sufficient to review only those
portions of the record that are germane to the arguable issues of merit
identified in the submission. It is not the court’s job, the Seventh Circuit
has held, “to comb the record even where the Anders brief appeared to be
perfectly adequate, searching for possible nonfrivolous issues that both
the lawyer and his client may have overlooked.” 232
One could logically posit that the degree of review should be a
function of the quality of the lawyer’s submission. 233 The better the
lawyer’s brief, the more reasonable it would be for a court to accept the
representation that there are no nonfrivolous arguments. But that
argument suffers from a fallacy that the court can reasonably infer
adequate scrutiny of the record from a brief that appears facially sound.
Perhaps that inference is warranted sometimes, or even often, but not
consistently enough to be a reliable bellwether of constitutional
safeguards for the client.
There is, then, no uniform answer to this question; federal circuits
have reached different conclusions. 234 While the Seventh Circuit confines
its review to the portions identified by counsel, the Fourth Circuit, for
example, “review[s] the entire record,” 235 regardless of the quality of the
submission. Neither approach is adequate.
Reviewing the entire record “adds substantially to the burden on the
judicial shoulders.” 236 More fundamentally, it requires judges to review
the record “much more meticulously than in appeals raising meritorious
issues.” 237 It thereby creates an inconsistency that is “particularly
disturbing to most judges.” 238 After all, “neither the indigent defendant
whose attorney does not file an Anders brief nor the nonindigent
232. Id.
233. See id. at 553 (degree of record review is “guided . . . by the Anders brief itself, provided
that the brief is adequate on its face”).
234. State courts are also divided. Fourteen state courts “do not comb the record to point out
arguable appellate issues.” Warner, supra note 10, at 656. Some state courts “point out only issues
constituting clear error, not merely issues of arguable merit.” Id.
235. See, e.g., United States v. Garvin, No. 19-4415, 2019 WL 5448589, at *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 24,
2019). Note that the Fourth Circuit approach mirrors the California approach endorsed by the
Supreme Court. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 265 (2000) (quoting People v. Wende, 600 P.2d
1071, 1072 (1979) (“[The appellate court] . . . must ‘conduct a review of the entire record’. . . .”));
see also Wende, 600 P.2d at 1074–75 (“We conclude that Anders requires the court to conduct a
review of the entire record whenever appointed counsel submits a brief which raises no specific issues
or describes the appeal as frivolous.”).
236. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 298 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
237. Warner, supra note 10, at 625.
238. Id. at 662; see also id. at 633 (if a court “considers issues not raised by counsel, then it is
performing for the indigent appellant a function that it does not provide for any other class of
appellee”).
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defendant gets this kind of review from the court”; 239 to the contrary, if
counsel pursues an appeal on the merits, courts defer to counsel’s
selection of issues to press. 240 Some have observed that offering a
comprehensive record review to a defendant whose counsel found no
nonfrivolous issue for appeal “require[s] an appellate court to abandon its
traditional role as an adjudicatory body and to enter the appellate arena as
an advocate.” 241
The Seventh Circuit first announced its middle-of-the-road approach
in United States v. Wagner. 242 Judge Posner, writing for the court,
explained that reviewing the entire record, rather than only those portions
of the record identified by counsel, “makes this court the defendant’s
lawyer.” 243 The upshot, he argued, is to afford the defendant more
advocacy than the Constitution requires or warrants:
The defendant ends up in effect with not one appellate counsel but (if he
is lucky) six—his original lawyer, who filed the Anders brief; our law
clerk or staff attorney who scours the record for issues that the lawyer
may have overlooked; a panel of this court that on the advice of the law
clerk or staff attorney denies the Anders motion and appoints another
lawyer for the appellant; the new lawyer. 244

He characterized this multitude of reviewers as “overkill,” as “it gives the
indigent defendant more than he could expect had counsel (whether
retained or appointed) decided to press the appeal, since counsel’s
decision on which issues to raise on appeal would normally be
conclusive.” 245 So the Seventh Circuit does not “scour the record”; 246 its
239. Id.
240. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); see generally supra notes 84–93 and
accompanying text.
241. People v. Wende, 600 P.2d 1071, 1076 (1979) (Clark, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
242. United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 1996).
243. Id. at 552.
244. Id.; see also United States v. Fernandez, 174 F.3d 900, 901 (7th Cir. 1999) (reviewing the
entire record “unfairly gives the defendant the benefit of a committee of counsel looking for error”).
245. Wagner, 103 F.3d at 552.; see also Fernandez, 174 F.3d at 900 (quoting Wagner, 103 F.3d
at 552 (“[W]hen counsel files an Anders brief, we will not ‘scour the record’ looking for issues counsel
missed.”)); United States v. Pippen, 115 F.3d 422, 426 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e have noted before that
this court would not scour the record in search of an appealable issue if counsel has fallen down on
the job . . . .”); United States v. Tabb, 125 F.3d 583, 584 (7th Cir. 1997) (“If [the brief] explains the
nature of the case and intelligently discusses the issues that a case of the sort might be expected to
involve, we will not conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether a more
ingenious lawyer might have found additional issues that may not be frivolous.”); see generally Sarah
M.R. Cravens, Involved Appellate Judging, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 251 (2004) (discussing an appellate
court’s role in rooting out error not identified by the appellant).
246. Wagner, 103 F.3d at 552.
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practitioner guide declaratively warns that the court “will not conduct an
independent top-to-bottom review of the record in search of additional
issues that may not be frivolous.” 247 Instead, it confines its review of the
record to the specific materials identified by counsel, coupled with a
review of Anders submission and “the district court’s decision.” 248 That
narrow review, the court believes, serves as “a sufficient basis for
confidence in the lawyer’s competence to forego scrutiny of the rest of the
record.” 249
Judge Posner cautioned that this “intermediate position” is
appropriate only if the Anders submission is “adequate on its face.” 250 Of
course, that reasoning walks us back to the original problems that beset
both the court and counsel—how the court should determine if an Anders
submission is facially adequate without reviewing the record251 and how
counsel should go about crafting such a submission without throwing her
client under the bus. 252
At the core of Judge Posner’s intermediate position is that “[t]he
resources of the courts of appeals are limited and the time of staff
attorneys and law clerks that is devoted to searching haystacks for needles
is unavailable for more promising research.” 253 While it is no doubt a drain
on judicial resources to review the entire record of every criminal appeal
in which counsel seeks to withdraw, the allocation of resources hardly
seems an adequate basis for depriving the defendant of effective appellate
counsel. At the same time, it makes no sense to afford one incarcerated
defendant more judicial scrutiny than it offers his similarly situated
cellmate, all because the cellmate’s appellate lawyer is willing to press
even one appellate issue for a merit decision. In that sense, as the Supreme
Court observed, a lawyer who presses one weak issue on appeal thereby
“divert[s] the court’s attention from more meritorious, unmentioned
issues.” 254
3. What to Do in Face of an Inadequate Anders Brief
The third problem appellate courts encounter under the Anders
regime is what to do if they find something inadequate in counsel’s
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

7TH CIR. PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 19, § XVII(C), at 117.
Tabb, 125 F.3d at 584.
Id.
Id. at 553.
See supra § IV(B)(1).
See supra § IV(A).
United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).
See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 284 (2000).
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submission. A court can reach that conclusion in two ways. First, it can
conclude that the submission does not meet the Anders briefing standard.
That conclusion can itself take any of three forms: (1) that the brief betrays
an insufficient review of the record; (2) that the brief does not adequately
explain the issues that have arguable merit; and (3) depending on the court
rule, that the brief does not explain why the appeal is frivolous. 255 Second,
a court can disagree with counsel’s assessment of the identified issues as
frivolous.
The appropriate response to any of these inadequacies seems fairly
obvious: discharge the appointed counsel and appoint a successor. It
would appear appropriate to appoint a successor whether the submission
is defective or whether the court believes there to be an arguably
meritorious argument. Having already found a flaw in counsel’s
representation, it is hardly fair to require the client to suffer through the
merits process with counsel who has no confidence in the case.
Surprisingly, however, this is not the uniform approach. For
example, where the deficiency was with the Anders submission itself, the
Third and Seventh Circuits have directed the same counsel to file an
Anders-compliant brief, 256 deviating from that practice only after
concluding that the lawyer in question was a serial offender 257 or had
failed to provide a record to the court. 258 The rationale for permitting the
same lawyer to submit a successive Anders brief appears to include the
notion that “going through the exercise required by Anders “will cause the
lawyer to “change his mind and decide that his client has a meritorious,
or at least nonfrivolous, appeal after all.” 259 The better approach would be
to have another lawyer assess the case, as I explain below.
When the brief is not facially deficient, but the court nevertheless
disagrees with counsel’s conclusion that there are no nonfrivolous issues
for briefing, there is no uniformity. The Third Circuit stands alone in
addressing this subject by local rule, which requires the court to appoint a
new lawyer. 260 But appointing successor counsel is not the majority
255. See supra notes 97–107, 167–169 and accompanying text.
256. United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 782 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Edwards, 777
F.2d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Palmer, 600 F.3d 897, 898 (7th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Fernandez, 174 F.3d 900, 901 (7th Cir. 1999).
257. Fernandez, 174 F.3d at 902.
258. United States v. Pippen, 115 F.3d 422, 426 (7th Cir. 1997).
259. Edwards, 777 F.2d at 366; see also Smith, 528 U.S. at 290 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“On a
good many occasions I have found that the task of writing out the reasons that support an initial
opinion on a question of law—whether for the purpose of giving advice to my client or for the purpose
of explaining my vote as an appellate judge—leads to a conclusion that was not previously
apparent.”).
260. 3D CIR. R. 109.2(a); see also Marvin, 211 F.3d at 782 n.4.
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approach, at least among state appellate courts.261 Again, it is disquieting
that a criminal defendant, presumably incarcerated, must ever rely on the
services of a lawyer who has already told the court his case is frivolous.
The one option that is not available to an appellate court if it
disagrees with counsel’s Anders submission is to decide whatever
meritorious issues it identifies without demanding merits briefing. That
approach was squarely rejected by the Supreme Court in Penson. 262
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit has granted a motion to withdraw, even
after noting its disagreement with counsel’s assessment of an issue, by
concluding that the error it identified in a plea colloquy was harmless and
not in the defendant’s interest to pursue. 263 On that basis, the court granted
counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed the appeal as frivolous even
though counsel had not identified the error in the Anders brief. 264 The
dissent, by contrast, critiqued the majority’s decision to determine
whether the issue was frivolous without the aid of a proper Anders brief. 265
The lack of guidance and uniformity on how to respond to a deficient
Anders brief or a brief that incorrectly characterizes an issue as frivolous
is worrisome. If a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to
competent counsel on appeal, the remedy for a court submission that casts
any doubts on counsel’s competency should be a new lawyer. That should
be the consistent rule, and it should not vary from one court to another.
C.

Problems for the Criminal Defendant

The focus of the entire Anders process, of course, is the client. That
focus hearkens back to the roots of the Anders procedure, found in rightto-counsel cases as far back as Powell v. Alabama. 266 With that focus in
mind, we should be very concerned about the troubling repercussions of
the Anders apparatus from the perspective of the client.
A defendant whose lawyer makes an Anders submission has
effectively told the world—certainly the appellate court and the
prosecution—that he has no case. A “lawyer submitting an Anders brief
is, in essence, offering an expert opinion that the appeal is devoid of
261. See Warner, supra note 10, at 656 (most state courts “simply order rebriefing by appointed
counsel”).
262. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988).
263. United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002).
264. Id. at 671–72.
265. Id. at 672–73 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (“[W]e ought to proceed at a measured pace in
adjudicating this case. We ought not to take definitive action on this appeal until we can be confident
that counsel has evaluated thoroughly the case and made with his client a careful determination as to
whether to raise the adequacy of the [plea colloquy].”).
266. 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932); see also supra notes 26–41 and accompanying text.
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merit.” 267 This betrayal is nothing short of abandonment. The ABA itself
uses the word “abandon” in describing its recommendation that appointed
counsel “endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a wholly frivolous
appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.” 268
It is beyond dispute that the abandonment is a direct function of the
defendant’s poverty. “[T]he wealthy can always seek a second opinion
and might well find a lawyer who in good conscience believes it to have
arguable merit.” 269 Even if a private lawyer is unable to identify a basis
for appeal, “[i]n no event . . . will [that] lawyer file in the wealthy client’s
name a brief that undercuts his or her position.” 270 But the impoverished
client whose lawyer refuses to proceed on the merits is left, quite literally,
to fend for himself. This hardly seems consistent with equal-protection
principles. 271
Of course, the defendant has the right to submit a response to the
Anders brief and to pursue any issues he thinks have merit. 272 Indeed,
some circuits focus on the requirement that counsel serve the client with
a copy of the Anders submission, suggesting that notifying the client
overcomes some of the problems. 273 Of course, the client “will ordinarily
not be learned in the law” and may be unable “to spot possible flaws in
his lawyer’s legal arguments.” 274 But courts nevertheless are sometimes
“influenced” by a defendant’s failure to respond, which courts construe as
“an acknowledgment that the appeal should be abandoned as hopeless.”275
This paradigm does not bode well for the reputation of the criminal
justice system. The premise of the Anders procedure is to protect a
criminal defendant’s constitutional rights, but defendants are unlikely to
view it that way when it results in abandonment. “It is no secret that
indigent clients often mistrust the lawyers appointed to represent them.” 276
The mistrust stems in part from the reality that “the very State that is

267. United States v. Tabb, 125 F.3d 583, 584 (7th Cir. 1997).
268. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 51, at § 21-3.2(b)(i) (2d ed. 1980).
269. McCoy v. Ct. of App. of Wisc., 486 U.S. 429, 452 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
270. Id.
271. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text (discussing equal-protection principles
underlying right to counsel).
272. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (court must permit defendant, after
being served with counsel’s submission, “to raise any points that he chooses”).
273. See 6TH CIR. R. 12(c)(4)(C); 5th Cir. Anders Guidelines, supra note 18, at 1; D.C. CIR.
HANDBOOK, supra note 18, § VI(D)(2), at 26; see also United States v. Cervantes, 795 F.3d 1189,
1189–90 (10th Cir. 2015) (focusing on need to provide client substance of submission “in a language
he understands”).
274. United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 552 (7th Cir. 1996).
275. United States v. Tabb, 125 F.3d 583, 584 (7th Cir. 1997).
276. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 761 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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resolved to deprive appellant of liberty pays his defense counsel.” 277
History can bear out the mistrust when, for example, a lawyer for a
defendant recounts arguments against him “[f]or nearly seven pages” and
“openly support[s] the trial court’s various rulings with case citations and
counsel’s own opinions.” 278
We can and must do better. I offer in the next section a proposal for
doing just that.
V. A NEW PATH FORWARD
Given all the problems, many commentators have suggested
discarding the Anders procedure altogether and simply requiring assigned
counsel, in some fashion, to argue the case on the merits. 279 Many state
courts have taken precisely that step. 280 In Ohio alone, three appellate
districts have announced they will no longer accept Anders briefs, while
the other nine still accept them. 281
The inconsistency itself, while in keeping with the Court’s invitation
for experimentation, 282 is troubling. It shows that a major premise of
Anders—that in substantial numbers of cases, an appeal is frivolous, so
we need to give lawyers a way out—is flawed. It is absurd to suggest that
appeals are sometimes frivolous in one Ohio county but never frivolous
in the next county over.
It is also absurd to condition withdrawal of counsel on the court’s
finding that an appeal is frivolous. It forces the lawyer to cast aspersions
on her client’s matter when in fact it may be the lawyer’s own lack of
expertise that leads to her desire to step away. Her lack of expertise should
be enough of a reason on its own.
At the same time, permitting a lawyer to withdraw necessitates the
appointment of another. And potentially another. If multiple lawyers are
unable to proceed in good faith, how many times must the court appoint
new counsel before it concludes that it can find none willing to pursue the
merits? And how do we resolve the tension among the parties in a way
that permits withdrawal, protects the client’s rights, and relieves the court
of its ambiguous duty to review the record?
277. McCoy v. Ct. of App. of Wisc., 486 U.S. 429, 445 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
278. See, e.g., Robinson v. Black, 812 F.2d 1084, 1085 (8th Cir. 1987).
279. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
281. PAINTER & POLLIS, supra note 204, § 5:27, at 277–78; see also State v. Sims, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 107724, 2019–Ohio–4975, ¶ 60 (Boyle, J., dissenting) (advocating elimination of
Anders briefs in the appellate district that includes Cleveland).
282. See supra note 128 and accompanying text; infra note 290 and accompanying text.
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I have a proposal.
A.

The Proposal: Three Tiers of Counsel

I propose that when a court appoints counsel to handle a criminal
appeal, it should appoint two backup lawyers. The initially appointed
appellate lawyer then reviews the case and handles the appeal as she
normally would, unless she believes it is frivolous. At that point, she
hands the case off to the first backup lawyer, who proceeds in the same
fashion. If the first backup lawyer hands the case off to the second backup
lawyer, and the second backup lawyer in turn believes the case is
frivolous, they present their joint written conclusions to the client (not the
court), in a form that might approximate a thorough Anders brief. 283 They
then exercise an automatic right to withdraw, and the client’s right to
appointed counsel terminates. The court would have no role in reviewing
the case at this juncture. The defendant would always retain the right to
proceed pro se or through another lawyer if he can find one willing to
represent him after the right to appointed counsel has ended.
I further propose a fee structure that maximizes the incentives to
pursue the merits. For example, the second lawyer could be eligible for
twice the normal fee if she is willing to pursue the case on the merits. And
perhaps the third lawyer would be eligible for even more. The precise
differences could also be a function of the lawyer’s level of expertise. The
idea is to reward lawyers for the acumen to identify and pursue
nonfrivolous issues. There is some indirect precedent for a financial
incentive system. 284 It would most logically be in the form of a
congressional amendment to the statute governing fees for appointed
appellate counsel. 285
The appointment process would also require some scrutiny. At least
one of the three lawyers should have a strong history of expertise,

283. My proposal would require some careful thought in determining the level of detail the
initially appointed lawyer provides to the first backup lawyer, and likewise, the detail that the first
backup lawyer provides to the second. Efficiency concerns would justify full candor at every stage,
but backup lawyers may more readily uncover meritorious bases for appeal if not influenced by the
specific analyses of her predecessor(s). Relatedly, the format of the presentation to the client—
whether it involves three separate reviews appended to each other or a cumulative review prepared
by the second backup lawyer—would require thorough consideration. These decisions might also
influence the compensation system, because they may bear on the amount of work each successive
lawyer would be required to perform.
284. See United States v. Burnett, 989 F.2d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 1993) (denying fees to counsel
whose Anders submission was “for all practical purposes worthless”).
285. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(2) (2018).
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measured by resume, case history, and peer reputation. 286 Where the mostexperienced lawyer enters the picture is worth debating; one could argue
that appointing the most-experienced lawyer to serve as the first lawyer
would foster efficiency, in that she would be less likely to invoke the need
for the second and third lawyers. On the other hand, a hierarchy that places
the most-experienced lawyer in the position of last review would enable
the junior lawyers to gain valuable experience while providing a safety
net (in the form of the third lawyer) for erroneous determinations that
might otherwise prejudice the client.
In any event, the appointment process should permit no lawyer to
serve as appointed counsel if she has invoked the withdrawal process with
unacceptable frequency. It is beyond my cavil to determine whether that
level of unacceptable frequency should be two times or ten, and perhaps
it should a maximum percentage of the number of appointed cases that
lawyer has handled. It also would be useful to consider, in assessing
whether to render a lawyer ineligible for ongoing appointments based on
a history of withdrawals, whether a backup lawyer in those prior cases
ultimately succeeded in briefing the merits; if so, that fact would militate
against future appointments.
B.

Measuring My Proposal Against the Legal Standards

The primary goal of the Anders procedure is twofold: (1) to ensure
that low-income defendants “whose appeals are not frivolous receive the
counsel and merits brief required by Douglas”; 287 and (2) ”to enable the
State to ‘protect itself so that frivolous appeals are not subsidized and
public moneys not needlessly spent.’” 288 My proposal achieves these
goals. The Supreme Court tells us that “the States are free to adopt
different procedures, so long as those procedures adequately safeguard a
defendant’s right to appellate counsel.” 289 Presumably the same holds true
of federal appellate courts, which may collectively adopt a procedure that
does not follow precisely the procedures approved in Anders, McCoy, or
Smith but nevertheless comports with constitutional demands. 290
286. One could reasonably require expertise from all three lawyers. That requirement would
perhaps deprive less-experienced lawyers of the opportunity to gain meaningful experience as
appointed counsel. The precise expertise balance is beyond the scope of my proposal, but it warrants
careful scrutiny in implementation.
287. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 277 (2000).
288. Id. at 277–78 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 24 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
289. Id. at 265.
290. Of course, federal courts need not collectively adopt a uniform approach; they are free to
experiment among themselves with different procedures to address meritless criminal appeals, just as
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The proposal protects the rights of defendants with nonfrivolous
appeals more robustly than the usual Anders scenario. The client receives
the benefit of not just one appellate lawyer, but three—each of whom is
charged with reviewing the entire record and considering all available
bases for appealing. This would meet Justice Brennan’s concern that the
client on the receiving end of an Anders submission “has no recourse to a
second opinion.” 291 Indeed, at the end of the process the client has one of
two things: (1) a full representation on the merits of a nonfrivolous appeal
by one of the three lawyers; or (2) a written explanation from all of them,
similar to an Anders brief, explaining why they are unwilling to proceed
on the merits. If the result is the latter, the document can serve as a basis
for pursuing the case pro se, securing another lawyer to appear pro bono,
or—in an extreme scenario—a later argument of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel. 292
Under my proposal, the court plays no review role in the process at
the withdrawal stage; each lawyer who has participated appropriately in
the review process would have an unfettered right to withdraw without
explanation. That aspect of the proposal resolves all of the concerns about
the required extent of the court’s scrutiny of the brief and the record, as
well as how the court should respond if it finds any inadequacies. More
importantly, it would excise from the process one of the most troubling
and offensive features of Anders—the delivery to the court (and the
prosecution) of a roadmap for affirming a conviction. “ 293
And there is no need for court review given the three tiers of counsel,
particularly with standards in place to ensure quality. Lawyers, unlike
judges, are directly accountable to clients for their legal malpractice and
can be disciplined for failing to meet duties of competence to their

states are. See id. at 272–73. Bryan Lammon has endorsed experimentation as a solution that “often
produces at least some evidence about the effects of an approach to a particular legal problem.” Bryan
Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation in Appellate Jurisdiction, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 423, 437
(2013). I agree with Professor Lammon and would welcome the opportunity to assess the efficacy of
my solution in a subset of federal circuit courts.
291. McCoy v. Ct. of App. of Wisc., 486 U.S. 429, 452 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
292. See, e.g., Evans v. Clarke, 868 F.2d 267, 268 (8th Cir. 1989) (recognizing habeas petition
as proper vehicle for pursuing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for improper Anders brief);
see also Grubbs v. Singletary, 120 F.3d 1174, 1176–77 (11th Cir. 1997). One court has suggested that
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is not an available basis for an Anders-based collateral
attack on the conviction, because the appellate court’s acquiescence in the attorney’s claim that there
were no nonfrivolous issues for appeal is res judicata. See United States v. McIntire, No. 3:08–cr–38,
2009 WL 3401265, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 21, 2009). That problem would not plague defendants under
my proposal, precisely because the appellate court would have no involvement in assessing the issue.
293. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 278 (2000) (“The obvious goal of Anders was to
prevent this limitation on the right to appellate counsel from swallowing the right itself.”).
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clients. 294 Judges, by contrast, have no such accountability. The Supreme
Court seems most concerned with ensuring more than “one tier of
review,” 295 but there is no reason further review should involve judges
whose interests are not aligned with the defendant’s.
The monetary costs of my proposal are also not likely to exceed the
costs of the current system, which include the cost of the withdrawing
lawyer’s preparation of an adequate Anders brief, 296 the cost involved of
the various court personnel (at least three judges and as many law clerks)
involved in reviewing the brief and the record, and the cost of addressing
any shortcomings in the submission or the possible need to appoint a
successor in the event the court finds issues of arguable merit. 297 Of
course, the monetary costs are inherently difficult to quantify and compare
meaningfully, particularly as they involve the time of court personnel that
for which records are probably not maintained, at least not at the level of
a case-by-case accounting that would be required. But monetary costs
should not drive the equation. The constitutional and ethical concerns are
paramount here. As the Sixth Circuit has recognized, “Anders should
never be invoked as a labor-saving process.” 298
Nor does my proposal do violence to any suggestion in Powell 299 or
its progeny that the right to counsel includes representation in a court.
Until Griffin, 300 the right-to-counsel cases revolved around the right to
counsel at trial and to resist the prosecution’s effort to prove adverse facts
that lead to criminal liability. But on appeal, the facts are no longer subject
to debate. The issues are legal, and the burden is on the defendant to prove
that something at trial went wrong. Representation, in that context, may
be adequate if it consists only of solid advice, rather than advocacy. The
Supreme Court tells us that the right in question is not “to have an
advocate make [the client’s] case to the appellate court,” but rather the
right “to have an attorney, zealous for the indigent’s interests, evaluate his
294. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L COND. r. 1.1 (“A lawyer shall provide competent representation
to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”).
295. Smith, 528 U.S. at 281.
296. 6th Cir. Notes, supra note 19, at 3 (“A properly prepared Anders brief can be, in some
cases, more labor intensive than a merits brief.”).
297. But see Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 90 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“There are
doubtless lawyers . . . who, for a substantial retainer, would have filed a brief on behalf of . . . urging,
with a straight face, all of the claims which petitioner’s appointed attorney decided were frivolous.
But nothing in the Constitution or in any rational concept of public policy should lead us to require
public financing for that sort of an effort.”).
298. 6th Cir. Notes, supra note 19, at 3.
299. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
300. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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case and attempt to discern nonfrivolous arguments.” 301 If there are no
nonfrivolous arguments to discern for appeal, the lawyer’s job is to say
so. If three lawyers say so rather than one, and if they explain their
rationale in writing to the client, we should assume the client has had the
requisite access to and assistance of counsel for purposes of due process
and equal protection.
VI. CONCLUSION
For over sixty years, courts have struggled with how to implement
Anders in a fashion that provides adequate protection without imposing
unreasonable burdens on courts or appointed counsel. I contend that these
struggles have been harder than necessary. Remove the court from the
assessment, replace it with more robust representation for the client, and
the problems go away. Counsel would no longer have to submit briefs
against their own clients. Courts would never have to act as advocates for
the defendant. And clients would receive input from three lawyers, not
just one—and would never have to swim upstream against an Anders
submission that represents to the court and the government that their
appeal is baseless.
Anders has plagued us for decades with its ambiguity. “Vague
standards are manipulable,” and they are particularly suspect when left to
judges “to safeguard the rights of the people.” 302 The subjectivity inherent
in the current Anders briefing process, as demonstrated in the numerous
problems it poses for lawyers, judges, and defendants, demonstrates that
“categorical constitutional guarantees” are not well served by “openended balancing tests.” 303 It is time we replaced the amorphousness with
a system that eliminates its pitfalls.

301.
302.
303.

See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 278 n.10 (2000).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004).
Id. at 68–69.
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